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TA he licensing of occupations often 
is accused of being stealth regulation 
that operates under the public policy 
radar screen. Unlike other labor market 
institutions, such as laws regulating 
unions or the minimum wage, the 
regulation of occupations has received 
little attention by the press, academics, 
or policymakers. However, this lack of 
attention is not because occupational 
licensing is diminishing in the labor 
market. Figure 1 shows that the growth 
of occupational licensing in the United 
States has increased far more than unions, 
a more widely studied labor market 
institution. Since the 1950s, licensing 
coverage has grown from about 5 percent 
of the workforce to more than 20 percent, 
while unions have declined from about 
a third of the workforce to less than 13 
percent, and to fewer than 8 percent in 
the private sector. Approximately 50 
occupations are licensed in all states, 
and about 800 occupations are similarly 
regulated in at least one state.
Occupational regulation has varying 
levels of stringency. The toughest form of 
regulation is licensure, where it is illegal 
for a person to practice a profession 
without first meeting state standards, 
which usually involve detailed education 
requirements, testimonials of "good
moral character," and a test. A second, 
less restrictive form of regulation is 
certification, which gives states a "right- 
to-title" protection for persons meeting 
predetermined standards. Those without 
certification may perform the duties 
of the occupation but may not use the 
title. A third and least restrictive form of
Figure 1 Comparisons in the Trends 
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regulation is registration, which usually 
requires individuals to file their names, 
addresses, and qualifications with a 
government agency before practicing 
in the occupation. Registration often 
includes posting a bond or filing a fee.
Although the regulation of individuals 
in occupations dates to ancient times, the 
guilds of medieval Europe are most often 
mentioned as examples of the imposition 
of tough restrictions on entering a craft or 
occupation. In the United States through 
much of the nineteenth century, few 
restrictions were imposed on occupations 
we often think of as licensed, such as 
doctors and lawyers. During the past 
50 years, however, with the increase 
in complexity of jobs, especially in the 
service sector, licensing of individuals in 
their jobs emerged as one of the fastest- 
growing labor market institutions in the 
United States and other industrialized 
nations.
One of the major justifications for 
occupational licensing is that it increases 
service quality. Yet the available studies 
offer little evidence that licensing 
individuals has an impact on the quality 
of service received by consumers. For 
example, my examination of data from 
Wisconsin and Minnesota finds no 
evidence of differences in consumer 
complaints between Wisconsin, which 
licensed certain health care occupations, 
such as physical therapists, respiratory 
care providers, and physician assistants, 
and complaints to state boards in 
Minnesota, which certified the same 
occupations.
Malpractice insurance premiums 
can also serve as the arbitrator of the 
effectiveness of licensing as a way to 
mitigate the harmful effects of inept 
practitioners. If licensing works as 
intended, it should reduce mistakes 
by licensed relative to unlicensed 
practitioners. The insurance industry 
would then provide lower premiums 
for practitioners in regulated states 
because licensing statutes (such as testing 
and background checks) would have 
weeded out incompetent or unscrupulous 
practitioners. However, my examination 
of the rates charged nationally for 
practitioners who are licensed in some 
U.S. states and not in others reveals 
that no price breaks on malpractice
Table 1 Key Findings of the Impact of Licensing on Enhancing Quality or 
Restricting Competition
Issue Key findings
Estimate of percent 
of workforce covered 
by licensing
Potential benefits of 
licensing
Evidence of the 
benefits of licensing




State variations in 
licensing
Redistribution and 
lost output due to 
licensing
U.S. and EU 
comparisons
Using Department of Labor and Census Data, percent of workforce 
covered by licensing is approximately 20 percent, a growth of 11 percent 
over the past 15 years.
Increased standardization of services and reduction in the potential 
"loss aversion" by consumers due to poor quality service.
Some evidence that the insured and higher-income gain from stricter 
licensing but no measurable impact on overall quality.
Licensing drives up prices, and the overall wage effect relative to 
unlicensed occupations in cross-section data is 10-12 percent, but 
impacts differ widely based on methods, occupations, and toughness of 
restrictions.
Within an occupation, the percentage employment growth rate is 
approximately 20 percent greater in states that do not require licensing, 
but impacts differ widely based on the methods and occupations.
Much variation in the number of occupations licensed by states and the 
percent of the workforce covered by licensing laws. Case studies show 
that political spending by the occupational associations is an important 
factor for who gets regulated.
Estimated redistribution effects to regulated occupations of between 
$116 billion and $139 billion in 2000 dollars, and lost output of $34.8 
and $41.7 billion per year, which is less than 0.1 percent of total 
consumption expenditures.
Both economies regulate entry but there is often no exam beyond 
university or trade school to obtain a license for many of the professions 
in the EU. EU nations regulate prices charged and the organizational 
structure of the professions to a greater extent than the United States. 
Wage effects for licensing are around 1 percent using cross-section 
estimates, but the impacts vary widely based on methods, occupations, 
and toughness of restrictions.
in insurance premiums were given to 
practitioners in licensed states.
Then what are the potential impacts 
of licensing? Restricting labor supply is 
one. For example, there was a decline 
in employment growth for librarians, 
respiratory therapists, and dietitians and 
nutritionists from 1990 to 2000 in those 
states that regulate these occupations 
relative those that do not. The estimates 
using census data show that, for the 
licensed occupations that were regulated 
in about one-half of all states, licensing 
reduced the percentage growth rate of 
employment by a statistically significant 
20 percent. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the impact of licensing on hourly 
earnings compared to similar unlicensed 
occupations was about 10-17 percent, 
depending on the occupations and the 
methods used in the analysis.
There is considerable variation among 
the states in the number of occupations 
licensed and in the percentage of the
workforce that is covered by licensing 
laws. For example, California licenses 
almost 180 occupations that cover more 
than 30 percent of its workforce. On 
the other hand, Kansas licenses about 
50 occupations, and these regulatory 
laws cover less than 12 percent of 
its workforce. If licensing has no 
productivity impacts yet increases 
spending, then simulations of the net 
expenses of the labor market regulation 
indicate it costs the economy about $38 
billion in lost service output per year.
The regulation of occupations in 
Europe takes a somewhat different form 
from that in the United States. Rather 
than focusing on postgraduation tests, 
countries such as France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom tend to regulate the 
prices charged and the organizational 
structure that is allowed by practitioners. 
With the smaller differences in the 
wage structure in Europe and the way 
occupations are licensed, the overall
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impact of licensing on hourly wages is 
much smaller than in the United States.
The major empirical findings in 
Licensing Occupations are summarized 
in Table 1. Given these results of the 
labor market impacts of licensing, 
other forms of regulation, such as 
certification, are suggested. Alternative 
forms of occupational regulation may 
provide consumers with more choice 
than licensing and reduce the potential 
monopoly impacts of licensing in the 
labor market. In order to better monitor 
the economic impacts of licensing, data 
on this form of regulation should be 
provided to academics and policymakers 
in the major national labor market data 
sources, such as the Current Population 
Survey. With more data and analysis, 
the public, workers, and policymakers 
can more accurately assess whether 
occupational licensing is ensuring quality 
or restricting competition.
Morris M. Kleiner is a professor at the 
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and the 
Industrial Relations Center at the University 
of Minnesota-Twin Cities.
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Employment and Wage 
Effects of Privatization
Evidence from Transition Economies
A he greatest opposition to 
privatizing a firm usually comes from the 
firm's own employees, who are fearful 
of wage cuts and job losses. Workers' 
apprehensions about privatization are 
consistent with standard economic 
analyses, whereby new private owners 
reduce the firm's labor costs in response 
to harder budget constraints and stronger 
profit-related incentives. Discussions of 
this "efficiency effect" of privatization, 
however, implicitly assume that the 
firm's output remains constant or at 
least does not increase. But lower costs 
may increase the firm's market share as 
well as total quantity demanded for the 
industry, and the new private owners may 
be more entrepreneurial in marketing, 
innovation, and entering new markets. In 
such cases, the firm's output will tend to 
rise, and if this "scale effect" dominates, 
then privatization could cause a net 
employment increase.
The implications of privatization 
for wages are also ambiguous. New 
owners may reduce wages as part of 
a general cost-cutting policy, but if 
the firm expands, it may have to offer 
higher wages to attract new workers. 
New private owners may also be more 
likely to adopt skill-biased technologies, 
resulting in a compositional shift toward 
higher-paid workers. Depending on the 
relative strength of such factors, wages 
may either rise or fall as a result of 
privatization.
Not only does theoretical analysis 
fail to provide definitive predictions 
on the wage and employment effects 
of privatization, but also the existing 
empirical evidence is both scant and 
inconclusive, containing both negative 
and positive estimates of the effects on 
workers. Therefore, the Upjohn Institute, 
in collaboration with partners from 
Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh 
and the Central European University
Labor Project in Budapest, has recently 
undertaken an empirical analysis of 
the effects of privatization on the wage 
bill, employment, and wage rates of 
firms in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine countries where thousands of 
businesses were privatized in a relatively 
short period of time during the 1990s. 
These four countries had varied success 
with privatization reforms. Hungary was 
considered one of the most successful, 
Russia and Ukraine were less successful, 
and Romania was somewhere in the 
middle.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
the average real wage bill and percent 
private ownership in each country. At 
this aggregate level of analysis, a strong 
negative correlation is evident in all 
four countries, which would seem to 
corroborate workers' fears and most 
economists' expectations. However, 
several other events that could affect 
the wage bill occurred during the 1990s 
(including macroeconomic shocks and 
market liberalization), and the firms 
selected for privatization may have been 
declining for extraneous reasons. To 
deal with these potentially confounding 
factors and estimate the causal effects 
of privatization on workers, the project 
has analyzed microdata on firms that 
have been linked over time. The methods 
applied to estimate the privatization 
effects at the firm level draw upon some 
of those used in evaluations of labor 
market training programs in the United 
States.
Privatization Programs and 
Implications for Workers
The methods and tempos of large 
enterprise privatization differed quite 
significantly across the four countries in 
this study. Hungary got off to an early 
start in ownership transformation and 
maintained a consistent case-by-case
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Figure 1 Evolution of Average Real Wage Bill and Private Ownership
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NOTE: The graphs show an index of the average real wage bill and percent of majority private firms on the 
vertical axis, calculated from our data. The real wage bill is set at 100 in 1989 in Hungary and 1992 for 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.
method throughout the transition. Unlike 
many other countries, there were no 
significant incentives given to workers 
to acquire shares in their companies, 
nor was there a mass distribution of 
shares aided by vouchers. Hungarian 
privatization thus resulted in very little 
worker ownership (involving only 
about 250 firms), very little dispersed 
ownership, and instead significant 
managerial ownership and highly 
concentrated block-holdings, many of 
them foreign. Although the process 
appeared at times to be slow and gradual, 
in fact it was completed earlier than in 
most other East European countries. 
In Romania, by contrast, the early 
attempts to mimic voucher programs 
and sell individual firms produced few 
results, and privatization really began 
only in late 1993, first with the program 
of Management and Employee Buyouts, 
and then with the mass privatization of 
1995-1996. The consequences of these 
programs were large-scale employee 
ownership and dispersed shareholding 
by the general population, with little
foreign involvement. Beginning in 1997, 
foreign investors became more involved, 
and blocks of shares were sold to both 
foreigners and domestic entities. The 
result was a mixture of several types 
of ownership and a moderate speed 
compared to Hungary.
Russia's and Ukraine's earliest 
privatization experiences have some 
similarities to the "spontaneous" period in 
Hungary, as the central planning system 
dissolved in the late 1980s and decision- 
making power devolved to managers 
and work collectives. In both countries, 
the initial consequence was large-scale 
ownership by managers and workers and 
some block-holding by domestic entities. 
Subsequently, privatization through sales 
became more common, secondary trading 
increased concentration, and foreigners 
made partial inroads.
These differences in privatization 
policy design could affect the impact of 
privatization on employment and wage 
outcomes through different impacts 
on the efficiency and scale effects of 
privatization. Worker-owners are likely
to oppose labor-saving restructuring, for 
example, and they are unlikely to have 
incentives or resources to expand output. 
Outside block-holders, on the other hand, 
should favor cost-saving restructuring, 
particularly foreign investors with access 
to management skills, new technologies, 
and financing; they also are more likely 
to respond to opportunities for expansion. 
Outsiders with small shareholdings 
may also benefit from efficiency 
improvements and scale expansion, but 
they are unlikely to influence the firm's 
behavior. Therefore, both the efficiency 
and scale effects of privatization are 
likely to be smallest for domestic 
owners in countries where insider and 
mass privatization predominated, larger 
in cases where domestic outsiders 
acquired blocks of shares, and largest 
for privatization to foreign investors. 
Because these mechanisms are offsetting, 
however, the relative magnitudes of the 
effects of different types of privatization 
on workers are ambiguous.
Estimated Effects of Privatization
A first finding from detailed analyses 
of the firm-level data in this project is 
that, even before privatization, there are 
significant differences between firms 
that are privatized later and those that 
remain state-owned. Across the four 
countries in the analysis, the direction of 
the differences of firms later privatized to 
domestic investors is sometimes positive 
and sometimes negative. But the foreign 
differences are quite consistent, as firms 
that will be foreign-owned have higher 
wage bills, employment levels, and 
average wages than either pre-domestic 
firms or firms that always remain state- 
owned in all four countries. Moreover, 
not only the levels but the growth rates 
of these outcome variables display large 
preprivatization differences. These results 
imply that there may be some selection 
biases in the privatization process, 
and that simple comparisons across 
ownership types may be misleading. The 
empirical estimates of the privatization 
effects in this project therefore control 
for any fixed differences among firms 
and differing trend growth rates that may 
affect the probability of privatization, and 
whether the new owners are domestic or
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foreign investors. We compare alternative 
estimators using several specification 
tests, including variants of the "pre 
program" test, which measures selection 
bias of an estimator as the difference in 
the dependent variable prior to treatment 
between the treated and comparison 
groups. In the privatization context, 
this test must be evaluated before the 
privatization year to avoid possible 
contamination through anticipatory 
effects.
The results from these estimations 
imply that, on average, privatization has 
had little effect on the wage bill. If the 
wage bill represents a summary indicator 
of worker welfare, the firm-level analysis 
in this project does not support the 
common belief that privatization hurt 
workers. When new domestic owners are 
distinguished from foreign investors, the 
results for the former tend to be similar 
to the overall private results, as domestic 
owners dominate in most privatized 
companies. The results also provide no 
support for the widespread fear of foreign 
owners; on the contrary, they provide 
strong evidence that foreign owners 
increased the wage bill in the two Central 
and East European countries in our study, 
and in the two formerly Soviet republics 
the effect seems to be zero in the most 
pessimistic case.
These results for the wage bill can be 
decomposed into component parts, as 
shown in Table 1 for employment and 
in Table 2 for wages. The tables show 
two alternative specifications that differ 
only on whether firm-specific trends 
are controlled for in the estimation 
procedure; in both cases firm fixed effects 
are included. The effects of domestic 
privatization on either employment or 
wages differ very little across the two 
specifications, in no case showing large 
negative effects. The largest in magnitude 
are the implied 3 5 percent reduction in 
wages in domestically privatized firms in 
Hungary and Russia.
The estimated effects of foreign 
privatization are positive for both 
employment and wages in both 
specifications in every country. The 
inclusion of firm-specific trends does 
make a substantial difference to the 
magnitude and statistical significance 
of the results, with substantial and











































NOTE: Foreign = 1 if the majority of the firm's shares are owned by foreigners in year t—\. 
Domestic = 1 if the firm was private in year t-\ but not majority-owned by foreigners. "No 
trends" specification includes firm fixed effects and industry-year interactions; "with trends" 
adds individual firm trends. Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in 
parentheses. * = significant at the 5% level. ** = significant at the 1% level.
significant impacts remaining for 
employment in Hungary and for wages 
in Hungary and Romania. Specification 
tests are somewhat inconclusive about 
whether it is best to include the firm- 
specific trends on statistical grounds, 
so the results are somewhat ambiguous 
as to whether the benefits of foreign 
privatization for employment and 
wages are uniformly strongly positive 
or sometimes merely weakly positive. 
In all cases, however, the data reject the 
proposition that the effects are strongly 
negative.
Table 2 Wage Effects of Privatization
Efficiency and Scale Effects
The results from this research 
suggest contrary to the expectations 
of many workers, policymakers, and 
economists that average wages and 
employment have not been substantially 
reduced by either domestic or foreign 
privatization. As discussed earlier, 
however, privatization may affect firm 
scale and efficiency in ways that produce 
opposing effects on workers. The lack of 
negative consequences could result from 
new private owners failing to improve 











































NOTE: Foreign = 1 if the majority of the firm's shares are owned by foreigners in year t—l. 
Domestic = 1 if the firm was private in year t-\ but not majority-owned by foreigners. "No 
trends" specification includes firm fixed effects and industry-year interactions; "with trends" 
adds individual firm trends. Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in 
parentheses. * = significant at the 5% level. ** = significant at the 1% level.
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effects that offset the efficiency effects 
of private ownership. To explore these 
possibilities, it is useful to decompose the 
estimated impact of privatization on the 
wage bill into unit labor cost reduction 
(efficiency) and output expansion (scale) 
effects. 1
The results of this decomposition 
show a striking regularity: foreign 
owners have been much more active in 
both dimensions than domestic owners. 
Although smaller, the scale effect is 
positive in each country for domestic 
privatization with the exception of 
Russia, where it is negative but small and 
statistically insignificant. The efficiency 
effect measured as unit labor cost 
reduction is positive for all countries and 
both ownership forms, although again 
it is larger under foreign ownership. 
This regularity holds for the scale effect 
measured as the effect of privatization 
on output and for the efficiency effect 
measured as unit labor cost reduction 
within each country. The scale effect is 
not only positive and significant in each 
country for foreign privatization, but 
also for domestic privatization with the 
exception of Russia, where it is negative 
but small and statistically insignificant. 
The efficiency effect measured as unit 
labor cost reduction is positive for all 
countries and both ownership forms, 
although again it is larger under foreign 
ownership.
The effects vary widely across 
countries: while the foreign effects are 
similar for Hungary, Romania, and 
Ukraine, they are substantially smaller 
in Russia. But the domestic pattern 
is still more pronounced, as Hungary 
and Romania show sizable scale and 
efficiency effects of domestic ownership, 
while both effects are negligible in Russia 
and Ukraine. Thus, the cross-country 
domestic wage bill patterns (small 
and negative everywhere) mask large 
differences in scale and efficiency effects.
Conclusion
Although economic analyses of the 
effects of privatization have focused 
almost entirely on firm performance, the 
greatest political and social controversies 
have usually concerned the consequences 
for the firm's employees. In most cases,
it has been assumed that the employment 
and wage effects would be negative, 
and workers all around the world have 
reacted to the prospect of privatization, 
especially that to foreigners, with protests 
and strikes. Yet there have been very few 
systematic studies of the relationship 
between privatization and outcomes 
for the firm's workers, and previous 
research has been hampered by small 
sample sizes, short time series, and little 
ability to control for selection bias. It 
has therefore remained unclear whether 
workers' fears of privatization are in fact 
warranted.
The new research in this project, 
however, finds no evidence of large 
systematic negative consequences of 
privatization for employment and wages. 
In two of the four countries studied, small 
negative effects on wages are estimated 
for domestic privatization, but they are 
indeed quite small (minus 3-5 percent). 
By contrast, privatization to foreign 
investors produces consistently positive 
effects on the wage bill, employment, and 
wages in all four countries, regardless 
of estimation technique. The precise 
magnitudes vary with the econometric 
specification, but even in the most 
demanding specification for the data, 
the foreign results are positive and 
sometimes they are large and statistically 
significant.
The project also investigates the 
two alternative mechanisms through 
which privatization may affect outcomes 
for workers: efficiency and scale. 
The negligible effects of domestic 
privatization imply that these effects 
are largely offsetting. In Hungary and 
Romania, however, the offsetting scale 
and efficiency effects have both been 
large, while in Russia and Ukraine they 
have been small. Foreign privatization 
has resulted in much larger efficiency 
effects in all four countries, but still 
much larger scale effects, resulting in 
the increased employment and wages in 
foreign-owned firms that we observe after 
privatization.
An important caveat is that 
privatization may affect other aspects of 
worker welfare, including employment 
turnover, fringe benefits, and other work 
conditions. The data used in the project 
do not follow workers who are displaced,
nor do they provide information on the 
alternative jobs for workers who are 
hired. The project therefore does not 
carry out a complete welfare evaluation 
of privatization, but it does provide new 
information on the effects on the wage 
bill, employment, and average wages at 
privatized firms, effects that would be 
important elements in such an evaluation. 
Subject to this caveat, the results of the 
project imply that efficiency-enhancing 
owners may be good for workers, at 
least in terms of average employment 
and wage levels. Greater efficiency 
helps firms expand sales, reducing the 
likelihood of severe distress and raising 
labor demand. Workers' employment and 
wage prospects are never systematically 
diminished by privatization, and in 
some cases particularly with foreign 
ownership they actually brighten.
Notes
This article is based on Upjohn Institute 
Working Paper No. 05-125, "Does 
Privatization Hurt Workers? Lessons from 
Comprehensive Manufacturing Firm Panel 
Data in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine," by J. David Brown, John S. Earle, 
and Almos Telegdy.
1. The wage bill is by definition unit 
labor cost times output, and therefore the 
proportional effect of privatization on the 
wage bill equals the proportional effect on 
unit labor cost plus the proportional effect on 
output.
John S. Earle is a senior economist at 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 





Firm Culture, and 
Workplace Injuries
Richard J. Butler 
Yong-Seung Park
In 2001, there were approximately 
3.7 fatal workplace injuries per 
100,000 workers (including 9/11), 
workers made 2.1 million trips to 
the emergency room, and workers' 
compensation insurance cost employers 
$63.9 billion. In addition, the indirect 












can directly affect the severity and 
costs of such accidents, HRM is usually 
seen as an auxiliary function that does 
not contribute to a firm's output.
Butler and Park draw attention to 
this oversight by presenting analysis of 
the impact of various HRM practices 
on firms' workers' compensation costs; 
specifically, which practices lower 
firms' workers' compensation costs 
and whether the impact is the result 
of changes in technical efficiency or 
induced changes in workers' behavior. 
They conclude with a set of policy 
implications for firms, workers, and 
workers' compensation policy.
105 pp. $15 paper ISBN 0-88099-275-1 
$40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-277-8 / 2005.
Job Training 
That Gets Results
Ten Principles of Effective 
Employment Programs
Michael S. Bernick
Recognizing that training 
programs can't be all things to all 
people, Michael Bernick, a former 
director of California's Employment 
Development Department, shows 
the types of training programs that 
do work and for whom. He identifies 
ways to improve performance among 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) 
contractors while exploring the best 
uses for state discretionary WIA funds. 
He also describes 
what it takes to 









the type of training that workers with 
disabilities must go through to get and 
retain jobs.
"With fresh insights gleaned from 
decades of experience, Michael Bernick 
addresses the human-capital challenge 
of preparing low-wage workers for the 
global economy. His realistic focus 
on incentives provides a road map 
for future policy." Michael Milken, 
chairman, Milken Institute
"In this book, Mr. Bernick goes 
beyond the conventional social welfare 
and social services strategies for 
unemployed and low income workers. 
He shows how our nation's job training 
systems can be reshaped to get results." 
 Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-California
273 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-281-6 
$20 paper ISBN 0-88099-280-8 / 2005.
Licensing 
Occupations
Ensuring Quality or 
Restricting Competition?
Morris M. Kleiner
"Morris Kleiner has produced the 
most thorough evaluation of the effects 
of occupational licensing in years, 
perhaps ever. In a rational world, 
this book would provoke interest 







where it is 
beneficial for 
those lucky 
enough to be 
granted licenses 
but not for society as a whole." Alan 
B. Krueger, Princeton University
"If you thought licensing was a 
boring minor issue in the labor market, 
this book will make you think again. 
Kleiner shows that a larger proportion 
of the workforce is licensed than is 
in unions, and that licensing raises 
wages and lowers employment without 
demonstrably improving the quality 
of services." Richard B. Freeman, 
Harvard University
"In Licensing Occupations, Morris 
Kleiner opens the way for a long- 
overdue national dialogue on the 
efficacy of the U.S. professional and 
occupational regulatory system. His 
work will surely excite numerous and 
varied responses from public protection 
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